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HOW TO TALK SO JURIES WILL LISTEN 
JANET RANDALL
At the Linguistics & Law Lab at Northeastern University we investi-
gate issues at the intersection of language and law, where linguistic analy-
sis can provide insight and tools for understanding language in legal 
contexts.  Our goal, across all of our work, is to improve justice through 
linguistic research.  In what follows, I will discuss one project in our lab, 
the Jury Instruction Project. 
I. THE JURY INSTRUCTION PROJECT
Our project on jury instructions began when the Massachusetts Bar 
Association (“MBA”) asked me, a linguistics professor, to help them re-
write the state’s jury instructions into Plain English.  The MBA was ad-
dressing a growing problem confronting US courtrooms: jury instructions 
are often incomprehensible to jurors, especially those with little education 
or rudimentary English.1  This excludes many jurors from equal participa-
tion but worse, it has led to misinformed verdicts and wrongful convic-
tions.2
Massachusetts’ interest in working with a linguist was inspired by 
California,3 which rewrote its instructions in 2003, and its team crucially 
included linguists.  An excerpt of one of their original instructions is in (1): 
 1.  See AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982); 
Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic 
Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1306 (1979); Shari Seidman Diamond et al., The 
“Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury Deliberations: Success, Failures and Next Steps, 104 NW. L. REV.
1537, 1538 (2012); Shari Seidman Diamond, Truth, Justice, and the Jury, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
143, 154 (2003); PETER M. TIERSMA, COMMUNICATING WITH JURIES: HOW TO DRAFT MORE 
UNDERSTANDABLE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 16 (2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1507298 [https://perma.cc/N3K8-3Y3Y].   
 2.  See Robert W. Benson, The End of Legalese: The Game is Over, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 519, 545-47 (1985); Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First Centu-
ry, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449, 451 (2006); Lawrence Solan, Convicting the Innocent Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 465, 469 (2001). 
 3.  In 1996 the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement stated that “jury instruc-
tions as presently given in California and elsewhere are, on occasion, simply impenetrable to the ordi-
nary juror.”  In response to the commission’s recommendation, the Judicial Council created the Task 
Force on Jury Instructions in 1997. Why did the Judicial Council authorize drafting new plain English 
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(1) Failure of recollection is common. Innocent misrecollection is not 
uncommon.4
 Though the judges or lawyers who wrote this obviously had no prob-
lem with it, most jurors would probably prefer the version in (2), from the 
2003 revision: 
(2) People often forget things or make mistakes in what they  
remember.5
And this version would certainly benefit jurors whose native language 
is not English or who have lower levels of education than others.  But why 
exactly do we prefer the new version? Below we’ll look at some of the 
linguistic factors that make (1) difficult to parse and (2) so much easier.  
But first, a little background. 
A. Background 
California started its jury instruction project in 1997, as part of a larger 
movement across the US.  It was not an easy path to take; the movement 
has faced many barriers.  The first is, of course, ordinary inertia.  But there 
is also active resistance of many kinds.6  Some members of the legal pro-
fession consider jury instructions “sacred texts” that should inspire in jurors 
a sense of awe & respect for the court.  Some have claimed that the empiri-
cal studies showing their comprehension difficulties were simply wrong.  
Others, who acknowledge the difficulties, think that revising the instruc-
tions wouldn’t get jurors to listen anyway.  A large number of judges op-
pose changing the instructions because they fear that it will lead to past 
decisions being challenged and to more appeals.  And many legal profes-
sionals think that there’s really nothing wrong with them.  So unless and 
until it’s been accepted that jurors can’t understand the instructions, there 
will be no motivation to change them. 
But the MBA was not among the resistors and, serendipitously, just at 
the time that they contacted me, the Linguistic Society of America (my 
professional organization) had started an effort of public outreach, urging 
jury Instructions?, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, https://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/ 
315.htm?print=1 [https://perma.cc/8UJD-GCHU]. 
 4.  Civil Plain English Comparison, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
https://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/314.htm [https://perma.cc/U9CT-SY4M]; Peter M. Tiersma, Re-
forming the Language of Jury Instructions, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37, 70 (1993); Jury Instructions,
PLAINLANGUAGE.GOV, https://www.plainlanguage.gov/examples/brochures/jury-instructions/ 
https://perma.cc/NQ8Q-AYX3  (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). 
 5.  Tiersma, supra note 4, at 48. 
 6.  Marder, supra note 2, at 464-66, 474. 
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its members “to engage the public in learning about linguistics and its 
broader value to society.”  The coalescence of these two things was too 
much to ignore and so I agreed to jump in.  But knowing about the re-
sistance—and being a researcher—it was clear to me that we couldn’t just 
start rewriting.  We had no funding, we had no staff, and there were two 
other prerequisites.  First, we had to establish that the purported confusion 
holds for Massachusetts jurors hearing Massachusetts instructions.  Sec-
ond, we needed to know what makes the instructions so difficult.  Only if 
we know that our instructions are confusing will the judiciary agree to a 
rewriting effort.  And only if we know what specific linguistic elements 
cause the confusion will we know how to rewrite them effectively. 
B. A Linguistic look at Jury Instructions: a preview 
To get the flavor of what kinds of problems plague instructions, let’s 
go back to the excerpts in (1) and (2): 
(1) Failure of recollection is common.  Innocent misrecollection is 
not uncommon.
(2) People often forget things or make mistakes in what they remem-
ber.
This snippet in (1), just ten words long, previews three problems that 
we will see in more depth below: 1) vocabulary, 2) negatives and 3) nomi-
nals.
1. Vocabulary
Often, legal writing is thick with the specialized vocabulary of the 
law, what lay-people sometimes call “legalese.”  Legalese terms are not in 
general parlance outside the legal profession and studies have shown that 
outsiders, including jurors, are often clueless about what they mean.  One 
study of jurors who had served on a trial found that more than 25% could 
not define admissible evidence, impeach, or burden of proof.  And more 
than 50% thought “a preponderance of the evidence” meant either “a slow, 
careful, pondering of the evidence” or “looking at the exhibits in the jury 
room.”7
Now, you might have noticed that (1) doesn’t contain any legalese per
se.  But legalese is not the only problem.  The same study showed that 
these jurors also had trouble with non-legal vocabulary.  More than 25% 
 7.  Tiersma, supra note 4. 
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could not define inference and more than 50% could not define speculate.
The problem is that these are “low-frequency” words.  If jurors don’t en-
counter a word, it would be unlikely that they would know what it means.  
So if this is the explanation for difficulty of (1) in contrast to (2), then there 
should be a difference in their words’ frequencies. 
The chart in (3), computed by Google’s NGram Viewer,8 compares 
the relative frequencies of uncommon, recollection and misrecollection
from (1) with the frequencies of forget, remember and mistakes from  (2).9
The former, unsurprisingly, clustered at the low end, are much less frequent 
than the latter. 
So, it is likely that the less-frequent words are more difficult for ju-
rors.  But how can we show this without comprehension data for these 
words?  We can estimate their comprehension from words with similar 
frequencies whose comprehension we know. 
 8.  An Ngram is a contiguous sequence of n items from a given sample of text or speech. The 
Google Books Ngram Viewer is an online search engine that charts the frequencies of any set of com-
ma-delimited search strings using a yearly count of N-grams found in sources printed between 1500 and 
2008.  The search terms used here are the six words on the right of the chart.  The years displayed are 
2000 - 2008.  See GOOGLE BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER, https://books.google.com/ngrams 
[https://perma.cc/D3BP-4VHV] (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). 
 9.   To better estimate the frequency of mistakes (as opposed to mistake) the INF function is 
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(4) shows forget at the top with the highest frequency; mistake and 
remember,  shown in (3), are even higher.  All of these words sit quite a 
distance above misrecollection, which clusters with the low-frequency legal 
terms that fewer than 25% of the jurors understood, and where the other 
low-frequency terms (recollection and uncommon, omitted for clarity) 
would also cluster.  To complete the argument, it must be the case that 
jurors understand the frequent words remember, mistake and forget.  But 
since these words are well-known to elementary school students, they will 
also certainly be familiar to jurors. 
2. Negatives
Strikingly, of the ten words in (1), four are negative expressions, 
which are known to be harder to process than positive statements.10 There 
is one overt negative, [not], two prefixes, [mis-] and [un-], and an “inher-
ent” negative, [failure].  Even more challenging is the more complex ex-
pression [not [uncommon]] which contains two negatives with one 
embedded inside the other.  The outer negative has scope over the inner 
one, which makes this combination harder to parse than two negatives 
whose scope does not interact, as in Sally did [not] catch the 8:00 train so 
she is [un]likely to be on time.
3. Nominals 
A third challenge in the ten words in (1) are the many nominals, 
shown in boldface below. 
 10.  Marcel Adam Just & Patricia A. Carpenter, Eye Fixations and Cognitive Processes, 8 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 441, 460 (1976); Marcel Adam Just & Herbert H. Clark, Drawing Inferences 
from the Presuppositions and Implications of Aƥrmative and Negative Sentences, 12 J. VERBAL 
LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 21, 21 (1973); P. C. Watson, The Processing of Positive and Negative 







652 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 95:3
(1)  Failure of recollection is common. Innocent misrecollection is not 
uncommon.
Nominals are complex nouns built from verbs and this excerpt con-
tains three: failure from fail; recollection from recollect and misrecollec-
tion from misrecollect.  Research has demonstrated that a nominal is more 
difficult to process than its corresponding verb, especially for poor read-
ers.11  Why is this?  When a verb turns into a nominal, the process elimi-
nates one or more of the verb’s arguments, which are the central pieces of 
the verb’s meaning. As shown in (5a), the verb fail takes one argument, the 
subject.  This argument is not expressed in the nominal failure in (5b), 
though the nominal nevertheless entails that “someone” or “something” 
failed. Recollect and misrecollect each take two arguments, a subject and 
an object.  And though the arguments are not expressed, the nominals rec-
ollection and misrecollection both entail that “someone” had a recollection 
or a misrecollection of “something.” 
(5) a.  [someone] fails                                          b.    failure
            [someone] recollects       [something]            recollection 
            [someone] misrecollects [something]            misrecollection
When we parse sentence (1) and try to assemble the components into a 
meaning, we relate the nominals back to their verbs and look for the verbs’ 
arguments.  When we don’t find them, we must mentally put them back in, 
an operation that has a cost.  Recognizing this, California’s rewriters creat-
ed the new version in (2) by replacing the nominals with verbs (forget,
make, remember) along with all their subjects and objects, and the sentence 
turns out to be much more understandable: 
(6)   [subject People]        often    forget           [object things] 
                                            or     make            [object mistakes] 
        in [object what]12 [subject they] remember 
 11.  See Frederick A. Duffelmeyer, The Effect of Rewriting Prose Material on Reading Compre-
hension, 19 READING WORLD 1 (1979); Jan H. Spyridakis & Carol S. Isakson, Nominalizations vs. 
Denominalizations: Do They Influence What Readers Recall?, 28 J. TECHNICAL WRITING & COMM.
163, 163 (1998).   
 12.  The object of remember, [what], is “fronted” in this relative clause construction. 
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C. A Recap and a Roadmap 
Our preview of legal language identified three problems with the two-
line snippet in (1): 
Though the sentences are short, (a) they contain many low-frequency 
words; (b) the message is framed in negatives, including the very challeng-
ing complex negative, [not [uncommon]], and (c) the verbs have been 
nominalized, their subjects and objects deleted.  But this is the tip of the 
iceberg.  The instructions that jurors hear are much longer than this snippet.  
In Section II, we turn to one of those, Massachusetts’ Standard of Proof 
instruction, and consider the linguistic challenges it poses and how those 
challenges can be overcome.  Section III introduces a Plain English version 
of the instruction, written by our team of lawyers, judges, and linguists.  In 
Section IV, we look at data from a series of experiments that tested whether 
the new versions lead to better comprehension.  In Section V, we conclude 
with our future plans and goals. 
II. STANDARD OF PROOF
A common instruction given to jurors is Standard of Proof in (7). 
(7)  Standard of Proof, Massachusetts current instruction 13
1.   The standard of proof in a civil case is that a plaintiff must prove  
2.   [his/her] case by a preponderance of the evidence.  This is a less
3.   stringent standard than [is applied] in a criminal case, where the 
4.   prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
5.   By contrast, in a civil case such as this one, the plaintiff [is not
6. required] to prove [his/her] case beyond a reasonable doubt.  In a  
7.   civil case, the party bearing the burden of proof meets the burden 
8.   when [he/she] shows it to be true by a preponderance of the  
9.   evidence.
10. The standard of a preponderance of the evidence means the greater 
11. weight of the evidence.  A preponderance of the evidence is such 
12. evidence which, WHEN [CONSIDERED] AND [COMPARED] WITH ANY 
13. OPPOSED TO IT, has more convincing force and produces in your 
 13.   See MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTIONS (P.F. Brady, J. 
D. Lipchitz & S. D. Anderson eds., 2008). 
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14. minds a belief that what [is sought] [to be proved] is more
15. probably true than not true. 
16. A proposition [is proved] by a preponderance of the evidence if, 
17. AFTER YOU HAVE WEIGHED THE EVIDENCE, that proposition [is made]
18.  to appear more likely or probable in the sense that there exists in 
19. your minds an actual belief in the truth of that proposition  
20. [derived] from the evidence, notwithstanding any doubts that may 
21. still linger in your minds. 
22. Simply [stated], a matter has [been proved] by a preponderance 
23. of the evidence if you determine, AFTER YOU HAVE WEIGHED ALL OF 
24. THE EVIDENCE, that that matter is more probably true than not true. 
The linguistic challenges that plague sentence (1) can also be seen 
here.  Leaving aside vocabulary for now, the other two—negatives (itali-
cized) and nominals (underlined)—are both syntactic and related to the 
structure of the sentences.  But this instruction poses other serious syntactic 
challenges as well. 
A. Syntactic challenges 
1. Passive verbs 
First, the instruction is filled with [passive verbs]—11 in 24 lines—
which are much more challenging to process than their active counter-
parts.14  The reason is clear in (8) with the two-argument (transitive) verb 
consider.  In the active sentence, (8a), the arguments are in the canonical 
English order, subject—verb—object.  The passive in (8b) disrupts the 
order: the object is in subject position and the subject is in a by-phrase, 
following the verb.  In (8c), the “truncated passive,” the subject is eliminat-
ed altogether. 
(8)a. Active                    [subject The jury] must consider [object all the evidence].
 b. Passive                  [obj All the evidence] must be considered [by [subj the jury]. 
 c. Truncated Passive [object All the evidence] must be considered.
 14.  See, e.g., Fernanda Ferreira, The Misinterpretation of Noncanonical Sentences, 47 COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. 164, 175-79 (2003); David R. Olson & Nikola Filby, On the Comprehension of Active and 
Passive Sentences, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 361, 361 (1972). 
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In Standard of Proof all of the passives are truncated passives, missing 
their logical subjects.  But even more confusing is that a different kind of 
by-phrase, [by a preponderance of the evidence], appears after two of these 
and tempts the listener to think that this is a passive by-phrase that contains 
the logical subject.  However, as is clear from lines 1-2 of the instruction, 
[a plaintiff must prove [his/her] case by a preponderance of the evidence], 
the subject is [a plaintiff] and it’s missing. 
2. Interjections 
Another syntactic obstacle in this instruction are three INTERJECTED
PHRASES, shown in (9) in small caps, which break the flow of their sen-
tences by splitting them in two.  To understand the sentences, we have to 
mentally reassemble the two parts, while omitting the [INTERJECTIONS].  
To see what this requires, consider a simpler case in (9a).  When an inter-
jection is jammed into the middle, separating the subject from the verb, the 
result is (9b), which certainly feels harder to process than (9a).  Compare 
this to (9c) and (9d), where the same clause is not interjected, but tacked on 
either at the beginning or the end.  The message is the same, but processing 
it is much easier.
(9) a. [The jurors must agree on a decision]. 
     b.  [The jurors] AFTER CONSIDERING ALL OF THE EVIDENCE [must agree on a 
 decision]. 
 c.  AFTER CONSIDERING ALL OF THE EVIDENCE [the jurors must agree on a  
`  decision]. 
 d.   [The jurors must agree on a decision] AFTER CONSIDERING ALL OF THE   
EVIDENCE.
3. Multiple embeddings 
Above, we saw an embedded negative [not [uncommon]].  But em-
bedding can also involve sentences.  And the embedding process can be 
repeated, the embedded sentence embedding another sentence inside of it,
and so on, like a set of nested Russian dolls.  This instruction has sentences 
with 3-, 4-, and 5- levels of embedding.  Figure (10) shows the “decon-
structed” 4-level sentence, which begins on line 11.  And notice that clause 
2 is broken up by an interjection (in bold), which as we just saw, adds one 
more parsing problem. 
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(10) [1  A preponderance of the evidence is such evidence 
   [2  which, 
                  [when considered and compared with any opposed to it],
     has more convincing force and produces in your minds a belief 
                       [3  that what is sought 
                              [4  to be proved 4]
                              is more probably true than not true  3]  2]  1] 
But even without the interjection, the sentence would be extremely 
challenging to listeners.  If there is one solid result in the psycholinguis-
tic,15 neurolinguistic,16 and readability literature,17 it is that embedded 
structures are more difficult to process than “flat” structures with little or 
no embedding. 
B. Semantic challenges 
A separate set of challenges come from the instruction’s words and 
phrases.  As shown in (11), using a fresh version of the instruction, four of 
these expressions (in bold) are low-frequency: stringent, sought, such 
evidence, and notwithstanding.  Nineteen (in SMALL CAPS) are 
“LEGALESE,” also known to make processing more difficult.18  Expressions 
that are both low-frequency and LEGALESE appear in BOLD SMALL CAPS.
(11) Standard of Proof, Massachusetts current instruction: 
             LEGALESE and low-frequency words 
1.  The STANDARD OF PROOF in a CIVIL CASE is that A PLAINTIFF
2. must prove [his/her] case by A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
3.  EVIDENCE.  This is a less stringent standard than is applied in a 
4.  CRIMINAL CASE, where THE PROSECUTION must prove its case 
 15.  Thomas G. Bever, The Influence of Speech Performance on Linguistic Structure, in
ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLINGUISTICS 65, 67  (Giovanni B. Flores d’Arcais & Willem J.M. Levelt eds., 
1970); George A. Miller & Noam Chomsky, Finitary Models of Language Users, in HANDBOOK OF 
MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY 419, 475 (R. Duncan Luce et al. eds., 1963). 
 16.  Marcel Adam Just et al., Brain Activation Modulated by Sentence Comprehension, 274 SCI.
114, 114 (1996). 
 17.  See George R. Klare, A Second Look at the Validity of the Readability Formulas, 8 J.
READING BEHAV. 129, 148 (1976). 
 18.  See, e.g., Rachel A. Diana et al., Models of recognition: A review of arguments in favor of a 
dual-process account, 13 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 1, 1 (2006). The article makes the point that 
“unfamiliar” language is difficult to process, and legalese would be unfamiliar for most jurors, who are 
legal professionals.   
2020] HOW TO TALK TO JURIES 657 
5. BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.  By contrast, in a CIVIL CASE
6. such as this one, the PLAINTIFF is not required to prove [his/her] 
7.  case BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. In a CIVIL CASE, the PARTY
8.   BEARING THE BURDEN OF PROOF MEETS THE BURDEN when
9.   [he/she] shows it to be true by A PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
10. EVIDENCE.
11. The standard of A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE means the 
12. greater weight of the evidence. A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
13. EVIDENCE is such evidence which, when considered and  
14. compared with any opposed to it, has more convincing force and 
15. produces in your minds a belief that what is sought to be proved is 
16. more probably true than not true. 
17.  A PROPOSITION is proved by A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
18.  EVIDENCE if, after you have weighed the evidence, that  
19. PROPOSITION is made to appear more likely or probable in the 
20. sense that there exists in your minds an actual belief in the truth of 
21. that PROPOSITION derived from the evidence, notwithstanding
22. any doubts that may still linger in your minds. 
23.  Simply stated, a matter has been proved by A PREPONDERANCE
24.  OF THE EVIDENCE if you determine, after you have weighed all of 
25.  the evidence that that matter is more probably true than not true. 
Notice that eighteen of the nineteen legalese terms are never defined.  The 
one term that is—A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE—is defined only 
after jurors have heard it three times, too late to be of much help.  But there 
is one more problem with some of these legal terms.  Some are made up of 
familiar words like meet in meet the burden.  These pose a potentially 
worse challenge than even the strictly legal expressions.  A listener will 
access the ordinary meaning of the common word, understanding meet as 
in meet the new neighbors, realize that this isn’t the intended meaning, and 
then need to recover and figure out what the intended meaning is, all while 
the rest of the instruction is going by. 
III. STANDARD OF PROOF: A PLAIN ENGLISH VERSION
Now that we have seen some of the difficulties in this instruction, 
consider the Plain English version in (12).  It was rewritten by a team of 
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lawyers, judges, and linguists connected with the MBA.  The problematic 
expressions are coded as follows: negatives, nominals, passives, [interjec-
tions], LEGALESE, and LOW-FREQUENCY words.
(12)   Standard of Proof, Plain English instruction 
1.  This is a CIVIL case.  In a civil case, there are two parties, the 
2.  “PLAINTIFF,” and the “DEFENDANT.” The plaintiff is the one who  
3.  “BRINGS THE CASE” against the defendant. And it is the plaintiff who 
4.  must convince you of his case with stronger, more believable evidence. 
5.  In other words, it is the plaintiff who bears the “BURDEN OF PROOF.” 
6.  After you hear all the evidence on both sides, if you find that the greater 
7.  weight of the evidence [- also called “THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE
8.   EVIDENCE”-] is on the plaintiff’s side, then you should decide in favor 
9.   of the plaintiff.  But if you find that the evidence is stronger on the  
10. defendant’s side, or the evidence on the two sides is equal, 50/50, then 
11.  you must decide in favor of the defendant. 
12. Now, you may have heard that in some cases, the evidence must 
13. convince you “BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.” That’s only true for 
14. CRIMINAL cases.  For civil cases like this one, you might still have 
15. some doubts after hearing the evidence, but even if you do, as long as 
16. one side’s evidence is stronger [- even slightly stronger -] than the
17. other’s, you must decide in favor of that side.  Stronger evidence does 
18. not mean more evidence.  It is the quality or strength of the evidence, 
19. not the quantity or amount, that matters. 
This instruction either eliminates or minimizes all of the confusing 
linguistic challenges in the current instruction. 
A. Syntax 
Instead of six negatives, there are three.  The six nominals have been 
reduced to two.  Ten of the eleven passive verbs are gone, and so are the 
[interjections]. This version does contain two new [interjections], but they 
are there to clarify the preceding phrase, not to insert a new idea.  And the 
multiple levels of embedding are reduced to two. 
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B. Semantics 
All of the LOW-FREQUENCY words and phrases—STRINGENT,
SOUGHT, SUCH EVIDENCE, AND NOTWITHSTANDING—are now replaced 
by more commonplace expressions.  And though most of the LEGALESE
remains (STANDARD OF PROOF, PLAINTIFF, BURDEN OF PROOF,
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT)
and two have been added (BRINGS THE CASE and DEFENDANT), each term 
is defined as soon as it appears, either explicitly or by appearing in a clear 
context. 
The question is, will this revised instruction be easier to understand? 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE: A SET OF STUDIES
The answer is yes.  Our lab has been running a series of studies, com-
paring comprehension of current Massachusetts jury instructions with Plain 
English versions, focusing on two of the linguistic factors that contribute to 
listeners’ difficulty: passive verbs and “legalese.”  We also asked whether 
reading the texts of the instructions while listening will boost understand-
ing.  We framed our research questions as the three hypotheses in (12).  
Study 1 tested undergraduate students; Study 2 used a more diverse subject 
group, Amazon MTurk participants, to try to more closely match the jury 
pool. 
 (13)   Hypotheses 
H1. Plain English instructions will show better comprehension than  
Current instructions.
H2. Two linguistic factors significantly impede comprehension:  
passive verbs and legalese.
H3. Reading while listening will improve comprehension over  
listening only.
Below is a brief overview of some of our findings. 
A. Study 1: Undergraduate Student Subjects 
Study 1 tested 214 undergraduates randomly assigned to the four 
groups in Figure 1.  All subjects listened to recordings of six Current jury 
instructions or their Plain English counterparts. Two of the four groups had 
the text to Read along (CR & PR) the other two just Listened (CL & PL).
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After each recording, subjects answered a set of true/false questions to 
measure their comprehension.  Before beginning, to introduce them to the 
task, all subjects had one practice trial. 
 Hypothesis 1 predicted that the comprehension scores for the Plain 
English instructions would be higher than those for Current instructions 
and as Figure 2 shows, they were, (CL 83% vs PL 86%) and (CR 87%
vs. PR 90%), though these differences were not large enough to be statisti-
cally significant (noted as n.s.).  There was a significant boost, however, 
with the addition of reading, as Hypothesis 3 predicted (CL 83% vs CR
87% and PL 86% vs. PR 90%).  Significance levels are shown by aster-
isks * = P  .05; * = P .01; *** = P .001). 
But to understand what happened with the switch to Plain English, we need 
to look at the six instructions individually.   
 As Figure 3 shows, switching to Plain English did have an effect, es-
pecially for the listening-only condition, in particular for instructions 3 and 
6.  These showed the biggest jumps from CL to PL and from CR to PR.
Figure 1 
Figure 2 
Comprehension Rates:  Four Conditions 
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But why did these instructions show the greatest boosts?  The explanation 
lies in Hypothesis 2.  Hypothesis 2 predicted that the current instructions 
that pose the most linguistic challenges—those containing the highest rates 
of passive verbs and legalese—should be the most difficult.  And this is the 
case, as shown in the left-hand bars in Figures 4 and 5.   
Instructions 3 and 6, on the right side of the dashed line, were the worst 
offenders (Figure 4).  They had the highest rates of these two factors, and 
these  same instructions  had the lowest rates of comprehension (Figure 5). 
Figure 3 
Rates of Passives & Legalese
Figure 4                                                        Figure 5 
Comprehension Rates across Six Instructions 
Listening  &  Listening+Reading 
Comprehension Rates across Six Instructions 
Listening & Listening + Reading 
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Plain English versions, which eliminated most of the difficult lan-
guage, improved comprehension.  Over the six instructions overall, the 
rates of passives and legalese dropped (Figure 4, right hand bars of each 
pair), with the largest drops for instructions 3 and 6.  And, as Figure 5 
shows, it was these two instructions where comprehension improved most.  
The difference in the left and right bars of each pair in Figure 5 is consider-
ably greater for instructions 3 and 6 than for the rest.
 But now you may be wondering why the improvements were not larg-
er?  There is a good reason for this: comprehension of the current instruc-
tions was quite high to start with.  The blue bar (Current Listening 
condition) is at 83%.  And why?  These subjects were Northeastern Univer-
sity undergraduates.  Would real jurors perform as well?  Probably not. 
Figure 6 shows the Massachusetts jury pool, nearly half of which (the 
yellow-green areas) has not gone beyond high school.  If we want to ap-
proximate juror comprehension overall, we would have to find a new sub-
ject pool, people who are more like Massachusetts jurors.  And that’s 
exactly what we did. 
B. Study 2: MTurk Subjects 
Our next study used a more diverse subject pool of 389 subjects in the 
same 4 conditions, recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
crowd-sourcing platform.  The methodology, materials and experimental 
design were identical, and our prediction was confirmed.  These results 
show striking improvements across all four conditions, as the bottom 
graph in Figure 7 illustrates. 
Figure 6 
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Figure 7
The reason is the subjects’ baseline scores, which were much worse 
than the students’ baseline scores.  So, there was much more room for im-
provement.  For the Current Listening CL condition, the blue bar, the 
MTurk subjects scored not 83% but only 67%—missing a full third of the 
questions.  Those who had the advantage of reading, in the CR condition, 
scored 80%.  Switching to Plain English raised both of these: CL 67%
went up to PL 79% and CR 80% up to PR 85%.  Viewing these results 
the other way, the improvements in the scores from the two listening-only 
groups versus the listening plus the reading groups were also significant: 
CL 67% rose to CR 80%, PL 79% rose to PR 85%). Figure 8 shows the 
same pattern in the individual instructions. Just like the students, these 
subjects found instructions 3 and 6 the most difficult, returning comprehen-
sion scores of 60% and 59% in the Current Listening CL condition, the 
scores across the six instructions again correlating with their rates of chal-
lenging linguistic factors in Figure 4. But here, as predicted, the blue CL
condition line for the MTurkers is much lower across all the instructions 
than the line for the students. 
           
Comprehension Rates: 4 Conditions 
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C. Can We Better Approximate Jurors’ Experience?
Grouping the Instructions: Study 3 
The MTurk subjects of Study 2 showed significantly worse under-
standing of the six Massachusetts instructions that we tested.  For the more 
challenging instructions, 3 and 6, they correctly answered only two-thirds 
of the questions, while the students correctly answered over 70%.  But we 
suspect that actual juror comprehension is probably even worse.  Here’s 
why.   
The procedure that we used for both of our experiments is shown on 
the left side of Figure 9: subjects listened to the first instruction, answered 
its corresponding true/false questions, then moved to the next, and so on, 
through all six.  They had to process and retain each instruction only long 
enough to answer its questions before dismissing it and moving on.   
In contrast, in a courtroom, the judge generally presents all the instruc-
tions “grouped” together, as shown on the right side of Figure 9.   
  Figure 8 
&RPSUHKHQVLRQ5DWHVDFURVV6L[,QVWUXFWLRQV
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And this is more challenging in two ways.  The jurors have no time be-
tween instructions to process the instructions individually, which puts a 
greater load on their “working memory”.19  And they have the additional 
memory challenge of remembering the entire group of instructions until 
much later, when they go to the jury room to deliberate.  The challenge of 
holding onto memories over time is captured in Ebbinghaus’ classic “For-
getting Curve”20 shown in Figure 10. 
Figure 10 
 19.  Nelson Cowan, The Magical Mystery Four: How Is Working Memory Capacity Limited, and 
Why?, 19 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 51, 51 (2010). 
 20.  Hermann Ebbinghaus, ÜBER DAS GEDÄCHTNIS: UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR EXPERIMENTELLEN 
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After 20 minutes of holding onto a memory, the likelihood of remem-
bering it drops to 58%.  After an hour, the amount we recall is down to less 
than half, 44%.  Since judges can spend up to several hours instructing the 
jury,21  the likelihood of remembering the earliest instructions is quite 
small. 
Suppose we tried to approximate this situation, by presenting all of the 
instructions in a group and saving the questions for the end, as shown on 
the right side of Figure 9.  This “grouped” order, we hypothesized, would 
result in lower comprehension rates compared to the “ungrouped” instruc-
tion order of Studies 1 and 2.  And we tested this hypothesis in Study 3. 
Study 3 is the “grouped” counterpart to Study 1 and uses identical ma-
terials, design, and student subject pool.  The only difference is the proce-
dure.  Instead of hearing each instruction followed by its questions, here, 
subjects first heard all six instructions and then the six sets of questions, in 
the same order as the instructions.  The subjects were 180 Northeastern 
undergraduates. 
 21.  Marder, supra note 2, at 452.   
Figure 11 
Ungrouped vs. Grouped Instructions
Overall Comprehension rates: students
*
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 In Figure 11 are the overall comprehension rates of our Study 3 sub-
jects (the lighter bar) compared with the subjects in Study 1 (the darker 
bar).  The results confirm our hypothesis.  The subjects who heard the 
grouped instructions performed significantly worse overall than those who 
heard the ungrouped instructions (p < 0.001).  In other words, the new 
Study 3 subjects, who heard the instructions grouped together and had to 
hold them in memory to answer questions at the end, gave significantly 
fewer correct responses than the Study 1 subjects, who answered the ques-
tions for each instruction immediately after hearing it. 
Figure 12 shows the “grouped” results broken down by condition.  As 
in our earlier two studies, here again switching to Plain English made a 
significant difference.  Scores for the Plain English instructions were sig-
nificantly higher than for Current instructions for both the Listening-only 
(PL 82% vs. CL 79%; p < 0.01) and Reading (PR 87% vs CR 79%; p < 
0.05) conditions.  Reading also improved comprehension for both the cur-
rent and Plain English instructions, though those differences did not reach 
significance.  However, the combined effects of reading and Plain English 
were highly significant (PR 87% vs. CL 79%; p < 0.001). 
 Finally, Figure 13, which compares the two studies by condition, 
shows the expected trends.  In every condition, the grouped scores (the 
                                       Figure 12 
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lighter bars) are lower than the ungrouped scores (the darker bars).  Also as 
predicted, CL has the lowest comprehension rates, PR has the highest, and 
CR and PL fall in between.  So, Study 3 reinforces the conclusions of our 
two earlier studies: (1) Plain English instructions improve comprehension 
over Current instructions; (2) Giving listeners the possibility to read the 
instructions while listening improves comprehension even more.  But 
Study 3 adds one other important piece of the picture, by getting us closer 
to predicting what jurors will do. 
 Like the subjects in Study 3, jurors hear a stream of jury instructions 
without a break and later, sometimes hours later, they are asked to think 
back about what they remember of them.  With its procedure much more 
like what jurors confront, Study 3, to use a term of art, has more “ecologi-
cal validity” than our earlier studies.  Presenting the instructions in a group 
rather than interspersing them with their corresponding questions adds to 
real-world jurors’ processing and memory loads and decreases their com-
prehension.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Taken together, Studies 1, 2, and 3 demonstrate that (a) current jury 
instructions pose difficulties for understanding; (b) two linguistic factors—
passive verbs and legalese—affect difficulty: instructions with higher rates 
of passive verbs and legalese are more challenging than those with lower 
Figure 13 
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rates; and (c) rewritten instructions that minimize or eliminate these lin-
guistic factors are easier to understand.  Understanding is also improved 
when listeners (d) can read the instructions while they listen; (e) have time 
to process each instruction before hearing the next; and (f) are able to apply 
the instructions before they forget them. 
Our findings can inform courts on how to modify their instructions 
and their procedures for jury trials.  Allowing jurors to read the instructions 
while listening to them will help.  Breaking up the unbroken stream of in-
structions could also make a difference.  And when courts decide to rewrite 
instructions to make them more understandable to jurors, they might want 
to follow California’s lead and add a linguist to their rewriting team.  It’s 
not clear that courts are ready to do what is a long and potentially expen-
sive overhaul of their instructions, however.  There are many impediments.  
Aside from inertia and the cost and outlay of resources is the fear that new 
instructions will lead to more appeals.22  But there is also a widespread 
belief that the problem is not with the instructions but with the jurors, who 
just don’t listen carefully, so no amount of revising will help.23
The courts might be more convinced to address the problem if they 
knew what jurors actually do.  Our first study used college students as our 
subject pool; our second drew participants through an on-line platform to 
more closely match the demographics of Massachusetts jurors.  Our third 
study made our procedure more parallel to what jurors face in court.  What 
we need is evidence from actual jurors and, as this article goes to press, a 
new study with exactly this subject pool is in the planning stages.  The 
study will use our more realistic “grouped” methodology and a subject pool 
of actual Massachusetts jurors.  However, it is important for the jurors not 
to have served on a trial, since they would have been exposed to instruc-
tions, so our study will use dismissed jurors, jurors who came to the court-
house but were not empaneled. 
If our new results align with our prior findings, we will have strong 
evidence that it is time for courts to recognize the challenges of current jury 
instructions—and the way they are presented—and to take steps to improve 
 22.  This, in fact, is not true. According to an official of the California Civil Jury Instructions 
Legal Services Office, Bruce Greenlee (pers. comm., January 24, 2013), “on the civil side we have had 
a few reversals (less than five in 10 years now), [but] none of these reversals or criticisms had anything 
to do with plain language. They were all about the underlying legal premise. In short, there is absolute-
ly no reason to hesitate with plain-language civil jury instructions based on a fear that appellate courts 
will require the verbatim iteration of legalistic language found in civil statutes and case law. It just 
doesn’t happen.” 
 23.  Marder, supra note 2, at 472-73. 
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them.  And we will also have evidence about how informative collabora-
tions between linguists and legal professionals can be. 
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THE PRACTICE OF NULLIFICATION 
SONALI CHAKRAVARTI*
There is a cyclic quality to scholarly debates about nullification, the 
power juries have to offer a verdict of not guilty for reasons other than a 
lack of evidence, with proponents drawing on the vaulted legacy of jury 
independence as central to the legal system and opponents raising concerns 
about the ill effects of sanctioned departures from the rule of law.1 While 
both sides go back and forth, citing recent notable cases and the legal con-
cerns of the day, there is a sense that the conceptual conflict is at an im-
passe. The debate in the courts has often hinged on what, precisely, juries 
should be told about their power to nullify in the charge they receive from 
the judge. Drawing on the description of a practice by Alasdair MacIntyre, 
this paper offers another approach to thinking about the education of jurors, 
one that acknowledges that the jury’s relationship to law and justice, and 
the potential conflict between the two, is complex and requires repeated 
exposure and reflection.2 His idea of a practice is grounded in an Aristote-
lian framework that predicates the development of phronesis, or practical 
wisdom, on repeated opportunities for assessing which virtues are best 
demonstrated in which contexts, an approach I will explore as it relates to 
the civic education of jurors.3  Considering jury service as a practice pro-
vides a method to think about the standards of excellence for the activity in 
relation to its distinctive telos. Through education in the practice, jurors, 
aware of the power of nullification, are also aware of the standards of ex-
cellence for exercising it. In contrast to thinking about jury service as a 
practice, I will examine three notable cases involving nullification to exam-
ine how judges have understood the question of juror education and how 
the emphasis on the charge aides or detracts from a more ambitious vision 
*Sonali Chakravarti, Associate Professor of Government, Wesleyan University. 
 1.  See, e.g., CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE (1999); 
Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy inside the Jury Room and Outside the Courtroom, 65 
U. CHI. L. REV. 433 (1998);  David C. Brody, Sparf and Dougherty Revisited: Why the Court Should 
Instruct the Jury of Its Nullification Right, AM. CRIM. L. REV. 33 (1995); Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullifi-
cation within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149 (1997). 
 2.  ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 187 (1981).. 
 3.  Id. at 137-53.  
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of jurors’ capabilities. Lastly, I will consider the unusual ways in which the 
jury in the Camden 28 trial in 1973 experienced some of the benefits of 
thinking about jury service as a practice. Highlighting the multiple oppor-
tunities for civic education afforded to the jury in the case provides a bridge 
to thinking about the education outside the courtroom necessary for achiev-
ing the practical wisdom nullification decisions require. 
I. ARISTOTLE AND THE PRACTICE OF NULLIFICATION
The virtue ethical framework put forth by Aristotle is, from its incep-
tion, marked by an orientation toward political life as the space of human 
flourishing.4 It is the political sphere, and not that of the family or market 
relationships, that is marked by equality and a commitment to deliberation 
about collective well-being.5 Within the American system, it is arguably 
the jury process where citizens are most likely to have the experience to 
“rule and be ruled” in turn as they have a type of authority that is unusual 
for laypeople, selected by lot, in democratic institutions.6 To better under-
stand the type of virtues that are cultivated through jury service, it is neces-
sary to determine its telos—that is, its point of highest flourishing. Within 
an Aristotelian framework, one cannot simply say that “X” is good; one 
must ask, “Good for what?” and then examine “X” in relation to that high-
est ideal.7 With the increase in political partisanship and rancor in the high-
est workings of political life, the telos of the American republic is in 
dispute, yet the telos of jury service does not need to follow this same fate.8
People from across the political spectrum can better understand what it 
means to do one’s job as a juror well—including the application of the law 
to the facts at hand in an unbiased way as well as understanding the differ-
ence between law and justice. More profoundly, the telos of jury service 
includes enacting humanistic values such as situated judgement, wisdom, 
compassion, and mercy in ways that cannot be formulaic.9
 4.  See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE (Univ. of N.C. Press 1997); ARISTOTLE, THE 
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Oxford Univ. Press 1998). 
 5.  Melissa Schwartzberg, Aristotle and the Judgment of the Many: Equality, Not Collective 
Quality, 78 UNIV. CHI. J. POL. 733-45 (2016). 
 6.  ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 4, at Book VI. 
 7.  Id. at Book I. 
 8.  See generally JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF 
DEMOCRACY (2000); Vikram D. Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 203  (1995). 
 9.  This was the dominant view of juries at the time of the American founding. LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
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Much of citizenship today, especially as it pertains to voting, is prem-
ised on committing to a person or position and then marshalling all the 
evidence and support one can for it.10 Being a juror is an entirely different 
enterprise, in which the full discussion of the people and events involved 
must be considered prior to a decision about the guilt.11 Robert Burnes 
writes that the “hard tension of opposites created by the trial actually re-
veals something that could not be stated more directly” and that it is the 
juror’s task to experience this dialectical process.12 Yet for many citizens, 
the task of jury service is detached and removed from everyday life, even 
everyday political life.13 When a person receives their jury summons, their 
first thought is often about the inconvenience of the timing or the reasons 
they might give to the judge so that they will be excused from service.14 It 
does not appear to be an activity for which they are well-prepared and 
which will rely on previous reflections on what it means to be juror. The 
thought that jury service will be a chance to enact skills and practical wis-
dom that have been a long time in the making likely does not cross their 
mind.15 It is a one-off obligation, with the assumption that all relevant in-
formation about the obligation will be provided as needed. An alternative is 
to consider jury service to be a practice, an endeavor built upon the ongo-
ing commitment to a variety of skills that are simultaneously necessary to 
achieve just outcomes.  The language of practice is taken from Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s definition in After Virtue:
By a “practice” I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of 
socially established cooperate human activity through which goods in-
ternal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and par-
tially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human pow-
ers to achieve, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, 
are systematically extended. Tic-tac-toe is not an example of practice in 
 10.  See ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL (2009); NEIL VIDMAR &
VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT (2007). 
 11.  For experimental evidence about the conditions for high quality jury deliberation, see JOHN 
GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION PROMOTES CIVIC 
ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (2010). 
 12.  ROBERT BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 220 (1999). 
 13.  I thank Nancy Marder for sharing some forthcoming work on this topic with me. See NANCY 
S. MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS (2005). 
 14.  Akhil Amar has suggested that all citizens be prepared to offer one week of the year to jury 
service and could schedule it when most convenient. A fine of two weeks’ salary would be the penalty 
for shirking service. Akhil Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1169, 1178-79  (1995). 
 15.  Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Big Data Jury, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 935, 979-80 (2016). 
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this sense, nor is throwing a football with skill; but the game of football 
is, and so is chess. Bricklaying is not a practice, architecture is.16
The historical tradition of the jury in the common law system, includ-
ing its prominence in the Magna Carta which ensured a “jury of one’s 
peers” and later, the significant ways in which the jury system protected 
politically motivated prosecutions in the American colonies, attests to jury 
service as a “socially established human activity.”17 The internal goods of 
judgement, justice, and mercy emerge from the act of being a juror and 
sitting in the courtroom and deliberating with fellow jurors; they cannot 
solely be understood in the abstract, but with an appreciation of the respon-
sibilities and powers jury service entails. The language of a practice further 
suggests that repeated exposure and education is necessary to achieve a 
familiarity with both the rules of play and the challenges that emerge while 
engaging in the activity.18 While the jury is celebrated for its role in achiev-
ing justice, the standards of excellence that are “appropriate to, and partial-
ly definitive of” jury service have been undertheorized, largely restricted to 
obedience to the judge and commitment to the application of the law as 
written. Burns considers this to be the “received view” of the trial that of-
fers a version of substantive legitimacy that comes with treating like cases 
alike is only capable of communicating partial truths about the trial to ju-
rors.19 While these standards of excellence are not to be discounted, they 
are incomplete and there is a need for greater attention to thinking about 
what excellence in difficult situations of judgment, including nullification, 
looks like. This requires a commitment to civic education and discussion 
outside the courtroom about the history of the jury, its responsibilities, and 
the challenges of being a good juror. Out of these conversations, the stand-
ards of excellence for jury service may be debated and internalized. To put 
it another way, through their engagement with jury service as a practice, 
jurors should be able to understand what the novelist John Gardner meant 
when he said, “Every time you break the law you pay, and every time you 
obey the law you pay.”20 What it means to “pay” as a juror is symbolic and 
connected both to the integrity of the institution of the jury and the legal 
system, and to one’s own sense of fairness. There is a cost to legitimizing 
 16.  MACINTYRE , supra note 2, at 187. 
 17.  MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS (W. Publ’g Co. 1983); 
KRAMER, supra note 9. 
 18.  MACINTYRE , supra note 2. 
 19.  BURNS, supra note 12, at 11. 
 20.   Paul F. Ferguson et al., John Gardner: The Art of Fiction No. 73, PARIS REV. (1979), 
https://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/3394/the-art-of-fiction-no-73-john-gardner 
[https://perma.cc/PR3E-RLK9]. 
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punishment when, as a juror, one does not agree with that outcome, as 
much as there is a cost of undermining the rule of law by letting prejudice 
and shortsightedness influence the verdict. To understand which is the 
greater cost at the moment in question requires what Aristotle calls phrone-
sis, or practical wisdom.21
For Aristotle, phronesis is connected to intellectual virtue and, as such, 
requires the rational part of the soul that can be developed and trained over 
time.22 It is also housed in the part of the soul that molds motivation such 
that one’s desires are aligned with the virtues rather than in tension with 
them.23 It is not enough to understand what the virtues of courage, temper-
ance and magnanimity, among others, mean in an intellectual sense, but 
how one should embody them given the situation at hand.24 Using Aristo-
tle’s understanding of practical wisdom to assess jury service, the intellec-
tual task becomes salient as it includes a wide range of skills, not limited to 
the ability to evaluate the validity and significance of evidence, the under-
standing of probability and statistics (as it relates to DNA evidence, intel-
lectual property and other topics), the psychology of human nature and its 
variations, the challenges of memory and eyewitness testimony, as well as 
self-knowledge about one’s own prejudices and biases.25 These are all 
skills and areas of knowledge that jurors must possess as they aspire to the 
telos of jury service, the just outcome, but they must also consider a variety 
of other circumstances, including the legitimacy of the law itself, the integ-
rity of the prosecution, and the circumstances of the defendant.26 A consid-
eration of circumstances and its relationship to the evidence can be done in 
either a thoughtful or reckless manner; only the quality of the deliberation, 
maintained by the jurors themselves, separates one from the other.27 The 
fact that jury deliberations must be private and confidential suggests the 
need for greater education about the practice of jury service before a trial. 
There is no official to intervene when deliberations steer off course, so a 
broad knowledge about what jurors are expected to do before the trial is 
advantageous. The standards of excellence must be known in advance, 
 21.  ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 4, at Book VI. 
 22.  See JULIA ANNAS, INTELLIGENT VIRTUE (Oxford Univ. Press 2011). 
 23.  See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 4, at Book VI. 
 24.  Id. at Book III. 
 25.  I develop this idea more fully in my book. SONALI CHAKRAVARTI, RADICAL 
ENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE JURY ROOM AND PUBLIC LIFE (2019). 
 26.  See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011); MAHZARIN BANAJI &
ANTHONY GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE (1st ed. 2013). 
 27.  See ALBERT DZUR, PUNISHMENT, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY, AND THE JURY 139 ( 2012); 
Sherman J. Clark, The Juror, the Citizen, and the Human Being: The Presumption of Innocence and the 
Burden of Judgment, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL.  421, 426 (2014). 
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including the power of nullification and its potential for misuse, so that 
jurors can draw on this knowledge during their closed sessions. Within the 
structure of the trial, jurors receive so much information from the judge and 
opposing attorneys that additional information during the jury charge about 
nullification may not be as beneficial as education prior to service.28
The fears that judges have about deviating from sentencing guidelines 
suggests how difficult considerations of culpability and punishment are, 
even for those with experience and expertise.  In their book Practical Wis-
dom, Barry Schwartz and Kenneth Sharpe quote a judge who preferred the 
narrow constraints of sentencing guidelines because they take into account 
“all those factors I don’t feel competent to weigh: punishment, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, harm to society, contrition—they’re all engineered into the 
machine; all I have to do is wind the key.”29 This instinct to merely wind 
the key and get to a decision that incorporates the complex factors of a 
verdict with minimal effort may be appealing to jurors as well. If we want 
jurors to understand the standards of excellence that exist as part of the 
practice, we cannot wait until they have arrived at the courtroom to prepare 
them for it.
As part of his diagnosis for the crisis in moral reasoning in contempo-
rary life, MacIntyre regrets the loss of impersonal criteria that may be legi-
ble to others regarding what motivates an action.30 The presence of what 
MacIntyre calls “emotivism” is what critics of nullification fear—jurors 
will use the power in whatever way they choose without regard for any 
criteria beyond personal preference or political affiliation.31 He writes, 
“Emotivism in the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifi-
cally moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expres-
sions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in 
character.”32 The impersonal criteria when it comes to nullification is one 
of the hardest to define; critics have argued that it can never be done in an 
impersonal way because of the way political motivations will influence the 
standard.33 It is the concept of the practice that provides an alternative to 
emotivist debates that result in stalemates. Through examining the skills 
and goals that are intrinsic to the activity and developed for the sake of its 
 28.  See Sonali Chakravarti, Mistaken for Consensus: Hung Juries, the Allen Charge and the End 
of Jury Deliberation, in LAW’S MISTAKES (Austin Sarat et al. eds. 2016). 
 29.  BARRY SCHWARTZ & KENNETH SHARPE, PRACTICAL WISDOM 116 (2010). 
 30.  MACINTYRE, supra note 2, at 4. 
 31.  Id. at 11. 
 32.  Id. at 11-12. 
 33.  See Irwin A. Horowitz et al., Jury Nullification: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 66 
BROOK. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (2001). 
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telos, a standard of excellence emerges that can be understood by all practi-
tioners. Without the language of a practice, the link between the means and 
ends of an activity can be easily severed and manipulated to suit other ob-
jectives.34
In the case of jury service as a practice, the impersonal criteria for nul-
lification can only emerge through sustained discussion of the prescribed 
means of action, the nature of excluded concerns, and the various meanings 
of a just verdict—the telos of the practice. The impersonal criteria may then 
include the presence of compelling reasons to find the defendant not guilty 
in light of the ideals for democratic life to which jurors subscribe. Jurors do 
not need to believe that the verdict offered once should be the same in eve-
ry similar case, but they should be confident that the decision to nullify is 
consistent with the standards of excellence for jurors, not political power or 
self-interest.35 This requires repeated conversations over time with varying 
contexts for nullification and the ability to discern the relevant legal princi-
ples and personal virtues in each one. Still, one area where the expectations 
of a practice seem to diverge from jury service is in the repeated nature of 
the activity. One cannot play chess or football well if one does it once in a 
lifetime, or even once every five years. The complex nature of the under-
taking that constitutive of MacIntyre’s definition of a practice requires time 
and repeated effort to develop, understand, and master.36 The practical 
wisdom necessary for excellence in a practice comes from learning from 
the variety of outcomes that are possible and considering what aspects of a 
situation one might have missed in predicting those outcomes. None of this 
is possible with jury service as it is currently understood, but there are op-
portunities for much greater engagement with jury service through schools 
and community organizations, as will be addressed below. 
A. On Jury Departures from the Rule of Law 
The 1973 work by Kadish and Kadish on judicial discretion still re-
mains influential, and their analysis has much in common with the idea of 
legal judgment as a practice.37 Their emphasis on defining the distinctive 
role that different actors occupy in the legal world is critical to their 
framework for understanding when an actor may go beyond prescribed 
 34.  MACINTYRE, supra note 2, at Ch. 5. 
 35.  See Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2381, 2434-35 
(1999). 
 36.  MACINTYRE, supra note 2, at 187. 
 37.  See MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF 
LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES 73 (1973). 
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means in order to achieve the ends (telos) of the role.38 Each actor in the 
legal process must determine (1) the specific task his role is designed to 
accomplish, (2) the role’s function in the larger institution, and (3) the 
commitment to norms that transcend any institutionalized.39 Examining the 
specific task each role is designed to accomplish and understanding it in 
relation to the larger institution of the justice system is their way of  defin-
ing the telos of the practice and highlighting the powers jurors, for exam-
ple, have in relation to judges, police officers, etc. Once the purpose and 
context of the role are established, the next task is to consider the pre-
scribed means for the task and its relation to the prescribed end of the activ-
ity. In thinking about departures from prescribed means for performing 
one’s roles, they use the language of legitimate interposition in order to 
highlight how the agent “legitimates the interposition between the rule and 
his action of his own judgment that departure from the rule best serves the 
prescribed end.”40 The legitimacy of the intervention depends on the proper 
understanding of the ends of the role in light of the concerns that must be 
necessarily excluded in making such a judgment (e.g., favoritism, bias, or 
self-enrichment). Kadish and Kadish dismiss an approach to jury nullifica-
tion that tries to demarcate exactly when it is legitimate and when it is not, 
instead expecting jurors to understand themselves to be involved in some-
thing more like a practice, an activity that can only be understood in rela-
tion to the range of possible action and the distinctive ends of the role.41
Perhaps the most important aspect that emerges from both the idea of jury 
service as a practice and the role-based framework offered by Kadish and 
Kadish is the context it provides for understanding jurors obligations to the 
rule of law while considering the value of nullification. To say, on the one 
hand, that jurors should not aspire to fairness and equality under the law 
would threaten the integrity of the entire process; on the other hand, to say 
that it can never be questioned or challenged would threaten the ultimate 
function, or telos, of the jury. This middle ground of respect and adherence 
to the law and an appreciation that the role of the jury is to determine when 
law and justice might diverge and act in accordance with the telos of the 
institution is what must be cultivated in the education of jurors. 
 38.  For another look at role morality, see generally ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR 
ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999). 
 39.  See KADISH & KADISH, supra note 37, at 18-20. 
 40.  Id. at 67. 
 41.  Id. at 18-19. 
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B. On the Education of Jurors 
For potential jurors to understand the function of the jury, its pre-
scribed means, and the possibilities of departure for these ends, requires 
more than a short video in the courthouse before jury selection.42 It is a 
topic that can be introduced in primary education, reinforced with greater 
attention to the complexity of the task in high school and college and then 
revisited though community education.43 The civic education required for 
jurors could include discussion of the relationship between justice and legal 
decision-making as distinct from other types of civic involvement, even 
involvement on legal issues. For example, when high school or college 
students learn about drug policy changes, they should examine the issue 
from a variety of perspectives, including as an elected official, an anti-
prison activist, a family member of a drug offender, and a juror in a specif-
ic case. Each role requires a different set of considerations, including the 
demands of justice (in its many definitions), political expediency and ide-
als, policy, and medical treatment. Only by disaggregating the many differ-
ent issues that come up with the complex issues of crime in society can 
citizens start to see what is distinctive about each role and develop familiar-
ity with the practice of jury service. They can also begin to see how one 
can inhabit different positions yet still be motivated by the desire to be fair 
and enact justice to the best extent possible. One does not have to hold the 
same position across all roles. 
Social movement participants as well as political campaigns could 
publicize the responsibility of jury service and draw attention to communi-
ty workshops. I have attended one such workshop at the Urban League in 
New Orleans. William Snowden, a former public defender and the founder 
of the “Juror Project,” led the workshop and, over the course of an hour, 
spoke about the jury selection process, the benefits of a diverse jury, and 
important court cases affirming the importance of the jury as a democratic 
institution.44 He conducted mock voir dire interviews,  giving participants a 
chance to see how their responses to attorneys and judges might be under-
stood. Based on the questions participants asked at the end of the session, 
they seemed to be convinced of the responsibility they had to serve as ju-
rors and wanted to spread the word to their friends and families. Snowden 
did not talk about nullification during the workshop and gave no indication 
 42.  BURNS, supra note 12, at 5. 
 43.  See generally Sara G. Gordon, What Jurors Want to Know: Motivating Juror Cognition to 
Increase Legal Knowledge & Improve Decisionmaking, 81 TENN. L. REV. 751  (2014). 
 44.  For more information, see www.thejurorproject.org [https://perma.cc/R8MZ-MX9N]. 
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of the value of departures in the sense Kadish and Kadish discuss.45 The 
decision to omit such a discussion seemed both principled and strategic: As 
a defense attorney, he appeared to feel that diverse juries who could assess 
the evidence in an unbiased way would be a significant step in the direction 
of justice, leaving aside the question of nullification. Strategically, given 
that the workshops were already raising concern with local prosecutors 
who considered them to unfairly bias potential jurors, he did not want to 
draw further attention to himself by addressing the question of nullification 
within the sessions.46 His decisions further support the idea that even for 
those most committed to ideologically and racially diverse juries, some 
aspects of jury power are too provocative for casual discussion. 
As a former prosecutor in Washington D.C., Paul Butler saw Black ju-
rors issuing not-guilty verdicts in certain drug crimes where there was sub-
stantial opposing evidence.47 He found that these not guilty verdicts, likely 
nullification verdicts, were only issued when the offense was a non-violent 
crime that did not involve selling drugs to children.48 Butler’s analysis was 
that the jurors who voted against conviction in these cases did not think that 
removing the defendant from his community was the best response to the 
charge.49 The considerations of violence and the impact on children that 
jurors took into account gave Butler a sense that jurors could be discerning 
with the tool of nullification even if they have not been formally taught 
about it, but that it would be advantageous to expand learning about nullifi-
cation. In this way, he saw that these jurors had an emergent understanding 
of the telos of jury service and the use of both prescribed means and depar-
tures from it as a way to achieve this telos.50 He coined the term, “MLK 
jurors,” to capture this method of following a rigorous set of standards 
before committing to a nullification verdict, akin to the standards for non-
violent resistance as practiced by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.51 The refer-
ence to Dr. King can also be seen as using the standards of civil disobedi-
ence as a shorthand for the standards of the practice of jury service, 
highlighting the principles that should guide these types of civic engage-
ment. In his discussion of the guidelines for MLK jurors, he discusses the 
 45.  See KADISH & KADISH, supra note 37, at 10. 
 46.  These observations are based on conversations with William Snowden in March 2018. 
 47.  Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System,
105 YALE L.J. 677, 678 (1995).  
 48.  Shari Collins-Chobanian, Analysis of Paul Butler’s Race-Based Jury Nullification and His 
Call to Black Jurors and the African American Community, 39 J. BLACK STUD. 508, 508 (2009). 
 49.  Butler, supra note 47, at 679. 
 50.  Id. at 689-93. 
 51.  PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE (2009). 
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appropriateness of conviction for those who have committed murder or 
rape, distinguishing his argument for one that uses nullification as a way to 
stop punishment altogether.52 Furthermore, he suggests that MLK jurors 
who use strategic nullification “must engage in outside-the-courtroom in-
terventions as well. They would be obligated to take some civic interven-
tion in the name of public safety and criminal justice.”53 This connection 
between what jurors do in the courtroom and their involvement with legal 
questions outside gets close to the idea of jury service as a practice that 
overlaps with citizenship more broadly. It also speaks to the component of 
virtue that Aristotle understands to be central to practical wisdom.54 To 
truly understand the telos of jury service requires that one sees the relation-
ship between the actions of a jury and the opportunity to develop one’s 
character in demanding ways. The experience of nullification, in particular, 
should reflect a more demanding grappling with the tensions between law 
and justice. Once one has considered the factors that are involved in a deci-
sion resulting in nullification, one is better prepared, intellectually and ethi-
cally, to be involved with everyday questions of safety and liberty. 
II. NULLIFICATION IN THE COURTS
Understanding nullification within the practice of jury service contex-
tualizes the action in helpful ways that illuminate how jurors should think 
of their task. Yet, it seems nearly impossible for the court to take up this 
way of understanding it because the debate remains fixed on what jurors 
should be told in the courtroom about the power to nullify.55 That juries 
have the power to decide on the facts of the case as well as the law is often 
presented as a type of open secret, which is both obvious to anyone who 
cares to pay attention and a highly volatile power to be obfuscated and 
mired in ambiguity. When the court continues to maintain a high level of 
secrecy around nullification through punishing those who distribute pam-
phlets about it near the courthouse, for example, it assumes that the status 
quo level of education and awareness about the jury is optimal.56 Such a 
position fails to consider how the consideration of jury service as a practice 
with its own internal goods and standards of excellence may, in fact, be the 
 52.  Id. at 72-73. 
 53.  Id. at 74. 
 54.  See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 4, at Book I, Ch. 9. 
 55.  CONRAD, supra note 1, at 11; Aaron McKnight, Jury Nullification as a Tool to Balance the 
Demands of Law and Justice, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (2014). 
 56.   Brody, supra note 1, at 92; Roger Roots, The Rise and Fall of the American Jury, 8 SETON 
HALL CIRCUIT REV. 1, 31-32 (2011). 
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best way to achieve the type of considered judgment that motivates both 
defenders and skeptics of jury nullification. In the following section, I turn 
to cases that represent the status of nullification in the courts to show how 
assumptions about notification is the key question that undermines consid-
erations of jury service as a practice. 
The case of the recalcitrant jury who refused to convict William Penn 
in his 1670 trial remains the test case for the limits of jury independence 
and the foundation for all future claims of the power of a jury to nullify.57
The decision in the case maintained that jurors cannot be punished for their 
verdict and a not guilty verdict rendered by a jury, however unpopular, 
must stand.58 Yet, the 1895 Supreme Court decision in Sparf and Hansen v. 
United States amended that power by stating that a jury need not be explic-
itly told about its powers and has since been the precedent that has gov-
erned decisions regarding the education of jurors on the topic.59 A 2018 
case in California is a vivid example of how the court acknowledges it 
cannot outright ban certain references to nullification in the context of a 
jury charge, but it is not interested in how the power might be effectively 
communicated to the jury.  In United States v. Kleinman, a case involving 
the operator of a medical marijuana dispensary, the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit found that the jury charge offered by the judge went too 
far in suggesting that jury nullification was an illegitimate action of the jury 
in the following charge:
You cannot substitute your sense of justice, whatever that means, for 
your duty to follow the law, whether you agree with it or not. It is not for 
you to determine whether the law is just or whether the law is unjust. 
That cannot be your task. There is no such thing as valid jury nullifica-
tion[.] You would violate your oath and the law if you willfully brought a 
verdict contrary to the law given to you in this case. 60
Upon review of the charge, the court found that the first three lines of 
the following charge were acceptable, but the last two italicized here were 
not. However, they reasoned that while the wording in the last two lines 
was too strong and erroneously portrays nullification as unacceptable, it is 
not the type of error that warrants a reversal. The opinion goes on to read, 
“[B]ecause there is no right to jury nullification, the error is harmless.”61
The decision makes clear that while a judge cannot prohibit nullification 
 57.  Andrew Murphy, Trial Transcript as Political Theory: Principles and Performance in the 
Penn-Mead Case, 41 POL. THEORY 775, 776 (2013). 
 58.  VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 10, at 29. 
 59.  156 U.S. 51, 64-65 (1895).
 60.  United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1031 (9th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added).
 61.  Id. at 1041. 
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explicitly, the court is not at all concerned about jurors developing a nu-
anced sense of the larger goals of the task of judgement. Moreover, there is 
not the belief, as described above, that jurors who have an understanding of 
nullification are in fact more familiar with the telos of their function and 
this familiarity would be beneficial in cases far beyond those where nullifi-
cation is an active consideration. I would argue that ¨substituting one´s 
sense of justice¨ may, in fact, be consistent with the ends and purpose of 
the jury, but this would require a juror to have a more thorough understand-
ing of the task and the intellectual virtue of impartial judgment. Out of 
context, the previous lines, acceptable to the court in this case, would also 
be misleading to the jury. The charge as excerpted above aims to enforce 
the idea that jurors must only decide on the facts of the case, not the just-
ness of the law, and the court found this to be an acceptable distinction in 
the charge above. The subtle differences between the meaning of the lines 
that were acceptable the court from those that were unacceptable would be 
far less significant if the jurors came in with an understanding of their 
range of powers and the ways in which nullification could be misused. The 
charge would act as a reminder of both the telos of jury service and exclud-
ed factors but would not bear the weight of alerting jurors to this aspect of 
their power.
Although I am critical of the court’s focus on the language of the jury 
charge in United States v. Kleinman and the cases discussed below, the 
court is not wrong to be worried about giving jurors the wrong impression 
about nullification. The concept demands more sustained attention as part 
of the civic education of jurors, a responsibility that is outside of the court’s 
jurisdiction. Yet the fear of educating jurors about their power of nullifica-
tion has led to a broader fear of educating the jury about the work of 
judgement as a practice, one with obligations and standards that must be 
developed and scrutinized over time. Fearing the overuse of nullification, 
the courts’ perception of the nature and extent of the education of jurors has 
become overly rudimentary. Currently, both the court and the broader soci-
ety do not treat jury service as a practice worthy of greater consideration. 
An examination of how the court has understood the nature of jury educa-
tion in United States v. Dougherty and United States v. Spock stands in 
sharp contrast to conception of jury service as practice described above. 
In the case of United States v. Dougherty, the Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. circuit considered whether the jury for the “D.C. Nine,” who were 
charged with breaking and entering Dow Chemical Company as a protest 
against their manufacturing involvement in the Vietnam War, should have 
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been alerted of their option to nullify.62 The court was sympathetic to the 
claim that the defendants were not given the opportunity for self-
representation to which they were entitled (a separate basis for appeal), but 
on the question of whether the jury should have been told about their power 
to nullify, the court found that the trial judge had not erred in omitting the 
reference.63 The majority opinion explicated the important role of nullifica-
tion in the history of the legal system, including references to its pivotal 
function during the American founding, but ultimately did not see this his-
tory as leading to a mandate for the jury to be notified about nullification. 
Surprisingly, their decision conveys a hope in the broader education of 
jurors that I advocate for here, but wrongly suggests that it is already being 
achieved. The opinion is worth quoting at length: 
The way the jury operates may be radically altered if there is alteration in 
the way it is told to operate. The jury knows well enough that its pre-
rogative is not limited to the choices articulated in the formal instructions 
of the court. The jury gets its understanding as to the arrangements in the 
legal system from more than one voice. There is the formal communica-
tion from the judge. There is the informal communication from the total 
culture-literature (novel, drama, film, and television); current comment 
(newspapers, magazines and television); conversation; and, of course, 
history and tradition. The totality of input generally convey adequately 
enough the idea of prerogative, of freedom in an occasional case to de-
part from what the judge says. Even indicators that would on their face 
seem too weak to notice—like the fact that the judge tells the jury it must 
acquit (in case of reasonable doubt) but never tells the jury in so many 
words that it must convict-are a meaningful part of the jury’s total input. 
Law is a system, and it is also a language, with secondary meanings that 
may be unrecorded yet are part of its life.64
This is a remarkable set of observations about the education that the 
judges assume jurors are currently getting; and what they know “well 
enough” without the court taking responsibility for educating jurors in the 
full range of their prescribed means. They also acknowledge that a some-
what rigorous education is necessary to understand law as a “system” and 
to read the subtext of explanations of the reasonable doubt standard for 
example, but they do not consider themselves to be responsible for ensur-
ing that this education is provided.65 Still, analogous to any other complex 
system, a juror must have familiarity and a robust sense of norms of the 
practice to understand what is unspoken, especially in the charged and for-
 62.  United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-31 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 63.  Id. at 1128-29, 1136-37. 
 64.  Id. at 1135. 
 65.  Id.
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mal environment of the courtroom and the judge’s instructions to the jury. 
Yet it is this realm of the unspoken that the court in United States v. 
Dougherty would like to leave the power to nullify. This is an unusual line 
of thinking given how much of courtroom procedure is counterintuitive 
(being told to strike something from the record, for example) and how 
sternly jurors are told not to do outside research on the case. However, the 
excerpt above suggests that jurors will retain, and be able to act on, other 
information they gathered about their role from “current comment (news-
papers, magazines and television)” in an ambient manner. Later, the ma-
jority also expresses fears about thinking about jurors as ¨mini-legislators” 
who would be paralyzed by their power to decide on the law, a fear that is 
based in jurors’ perceived confusion about the nature of their role.66 If jury 
service had its own standards of excellence that were known and discussed 
in many fora, there would not be any confusion between juries and mini-
legislatures because the ends, constraints, and means of jurors as opposed 
to elected legislators would be understood. Furthermore, the opinion is 
marked by deep ambivalence about what civic education for jurors entails 
and should become—the majority seems to fear their own idealism about 
the practice of jury service. The opinion concedes that being a juror re-
quires much more training and time for reflection than is possible in the 
courtroom, but they are not particularly concerned about ensuring the jurors 
receive this. Moreover, they are naïve about the impact of judicial instruc-
tion on a jury. The judge is the authority in the courtroom and the one who 
has the power to hold jurors in contempt. Jurors must heed this voice above 
all others. The power to depart from the judge’s instruction, even in rare 
circumstances, requires focused education in the practice of jury service. 
In his dissent, Justice Bazelon is critical of what he calls a “deliberate 
lack of candor” in the court’s discussion of jury power.67 He writes, “Nulli-
fication is not a ‘defense’ recognized by law, but rather a mechanism that 
permits a jury, as community conscience, to disregard the strict require-
ments of law where it finds that those requirements cannot justly be applied 
in a particular case.”68 In this interpretation, he diverges from the majority 
with his suggestion that the trial judge´s instruction effectively closed off a 
consideration of “community concepts of blameworthiness,” a fundamental 
aspect of jury deliberation.69 Bazelon is also skeptical of the anarchy which 
the majority worried would ensue with change in the notification to jurors. 
 66.  Id. at 1136. 
 67.  Id. at 1139 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 68.  Id. at 1140. 
 69.  Id.
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In contrast to the preference for spontaneous nullification conceded by the 
majority, Bazelon makes an argument much more in line with the notion of 
a practice when he says the following: 
The juror motivated by prejudice seems to me more likely to make spon-
taneous use of the power to nullify, and more likely to disregard the 
judge’s exposition of the normally controlling legal standards. The con-
scientious juror, who could make a careful effort to consider the blame-
worthiness of the defendant’s action in light of prevailing community 
values, is the one most likely to obey the judge’s admonition that the ju-
ry enforce strict principles of law.70
Bazelon trusts the juror to be conscientious even when considering 
concepts that requires considerations beyond the letter of the law. Moreo-
ver, knowledge about nullification does not need to be left to chance and 
personality in the jury pool; it can be cultivated over time. Arguing a case 
before a jury that is aware of their power to nullify is the proper way to 
adjudicate a crime such as the destruction of property at Dow Chemical. A 
clearer understanding of jury service as a practice that requires education 
over time would not only help jurors see the different dimensions of such a 
case, but it would also give citizens paying attention to the verdict im-
portant information about the legitimacy of the law and the courts. In order 
to maintain the standards of excellence of jury service, there should be 
open discussion of verdicts by the public, including discussion of the uses 
and abuses of nullification. Justice Bazelon says, in a way that is resonant 
with the Camden 28 decision discussed below, as follows: 
If revulsion against the war in Southeast Asia has reached a point where 
a jury would be unwilling to convict a defendant for commission of the 
acts alleged here, we would be far better advised to ponder the implica-
tions of that result than to spend our time devising stratagems which let 
us pretend that the power of nullification does not even exist.”71
When the standards of the practice of jury service are understood and 
internalized, a nullification decision can become more informative than if it 
were a secret because the verdict is a better marker of what jurors want to 
convey. In an environment where everyone understands the telos of the 
jury and the means for achieving it, the public is also more able to react to 
the verdict (while respecting the confidentiality of the deliberation) and 
what it may indicate about the perceived integrity of the prosecution, the 
law, or other salient issues. 
 70.  Id. at 1141. 
 71.  Id. at 1144. 
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The appellate justices in the case of  United States v. Spock were more 
attuned to the inherent power dynamic present between judge and jury, and 
saw the need to protect the jury’s ability to be independent and offer the 
verdict they deemed appropriate.72 In the 1969 case, Dr. Benjamin Spock 
and three others were on trial for aiding and abetting the evasion of the 
draft. The defense’s case had rested on First Amendment protections of 
free speech, but they were found guilty by a Boston jury who had been told 
by the judge that the case was “not trying the legality, morality or constitu-
tionality of the war in Vietnam, or the rights of a citizen to protest.”73 The 
grounds for the appeal rested in part on the judge’s decision to give the jury 
a special verdict, ten questions that referred to different aspects of the law 
in question and the strength of the evidence, which were to be answered 
yes or no by the jurors as part of their verdict. The defense claimed that the 
questions acted as stepping stones for a path to a guilty verdict. For exam-
ple, the first question read: “Does the Jury find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that defendants unlawfully, knowingly and willfully conspired to counsel 
Selective Service registrants to knowingly and willfully refuse and evade 
service in the armed forces of the United States in violation of Section 12 
of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967?”74 The defense further 
claimed that the questions reinforced the idea that a not guilty verdict could 
only emerge from a failure of the evidence to persuade beyond a reasonable 
doubt, thereby eliminating consideration of a not guilty verdict for other 
reasons (i.e., nullification). The court agreed with the defense in their rul-
ing, finding that the inclusion of the special verdict serves to efface the 
decisive moment where a jury must decide whether guilt in relation to the 
evidence should result in a general verdict of guilt. We see the First Cir-
cuit’s vigorous defense of the independence of the jury in the following 
excerpt: 
In a criminal case a court may not order the jury to return a verdict of 
guilty, no matter how overwhelming the evidence of guilt . . . In the ex-
ercise of its functions not only must the jury be free from direct control 
in its verdict, but it must be free from judicial pressure, both contempo-
raneous and subsequent.75
Here, the court is not comfortable relying solely on procedural protec-
tions of the jury from undue pressure from counsel and the court but indi-
 72.  See generally United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969). 
 73.  Id.; John H. Fenton, Dr. Spock Guilty With 3 Other Men in Antidraft Plot, N.Y. TIMES (June 
15, 1968), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/98/05/17/specials/spock-guilty.html 
[https://perma.cc/9Y3M-M65Q]. 
 74.  Spock, 416 F.2d at 180. 
 75.  Id. at 180-81. 
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cates a willingness to look at the many ways pressure may be exerted on 
the jury’s verdict, even in subtle forms, and uphold its right to an independ-
ent decision. While post-hoc decisions such as this one that affirm the pow-
er to nullify are important, and it is worth noting that the decision here goes 
much further than the decisions in United States v. Kleinman and United 
States v. Dougherty in ensuring that the function of the jury is protected, 
inculcating in jurors a better understanding of the standards of the task 
before they reach the courtroom could further this goal. 
The debate in the courts about the exact terms used to discuss nullifi-
cation has led proponents of education around nullification to develop their 
own versions of the jury charge. Andrew Ferguson has suggested that jury 
instructions are a place of constitutional education where jurors develop a 
broader understanding about the many ways that juries are critical to the 
fairness of the legal system and with such an expanded discussion, even 
without mentioning it by name, the concept of nullification would become 
salient to jurors.76 Another proponent of greater juror education, David 
Brody, has formulated the following charge as a way to communicate to the 
jury the essential contours of their task: 
While it is proper and advisable for you to follow the law as I give it, 
you are not required to do so. You must, however, keep in mind that we 
are a nation governed by laws. Refusal to follow the court’s instructions 
as to the elements of the crime(s) charged should occur only in an ex-
traordinary case. Unless finding the defendant guilty is repugnant to your 
sense of justice, you should follow the instruction on the law as given to 
you by the court. You must also keep in mind that you may not find the 
defendant guilty unless the State has established guilt beyond a reasona-
ble doubt as it was defined previously in these instructions.77
Here, Brody is providing an account of the dominant task of a jury and 
what a jury in the context of a “nation governed by laws” is and then pre-
senting an exceptional circumstance, a guilty verdict “repugnant” to the 
jurors’ sense of justice. With this scenario, Brody is providing one path to 
nullification while also communicating the gravity of the law and the ju-
rors’ responsibility to it. In many ways the charge is using tone, one that is 
measured and cautious, to convey an intellectual orientation to the practice 
of nullification. The charge also re-asserts the explicit authority of the 
judge after opening up the possibility of nullification with the sentence that 
begins, “You must also keep in mind . . .”.78  This back and forth between 
 76.  Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Jury Instructions as Constitutional Education, 84 UNIV. COLO. L.
REV. 233, 235 (2013). 
 77.  Brody, supra note 1, at 121.  
 78.  Id.
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the authority of the judge and jury is also meant to convey the different 
considerations that must be balanced when deliberating about the verdict. 
With this charge, Brody is offering to jurors in a nutshell the set of con-
cerns that should govern their deliberations. This nutshell quality, however, 
may in fact distort the work of judgment in a way that is desirable neither 
for those who want greater education around nullification nor those who do 
not. It is too short to teach and too long to ignore. The charge also resorts to 
the shorthand of emotional response because a full consideration of the 
potential misuses of nullification is not possible. “Repugnance” has a vis-
ceral quality that suggests that a juror should use moral outrage as a way to 
gauge whether a not guilty verdict is the appropriate response, rather than a 
consideration of set of factors that can be discussed and debated in the 
same manner as other legal questions. The language of repugnance thus 
seems to invite excluded prejudices in (that may be intertwined with moral 
outrage) without a context for examining them. Moreover, the language of 
the extraordinary case, while effective in establishing a tone of caution, 
detracts from a full consideration of the telos of the jury and a considera-
tion of standards intrinsic to the practice. The attempt to communicate the 
broader function of the jury in a short jury charge is admirable and may 
realistically be the best hope today for informing jurors about their power, 
but it cannot fully convey what is required for excellence in the practice. 
A. The Jury and the Camden 28 
Given that the model of jury service as a practice may seem far too 
ambitious to achieve, is it possible that the best we can hope for is the type 
of cultural education that the majority described in United States v. 
Dougherty? I turn now to the case of the Camden 28 as an example of a 
jury that received education about nullification from a variety of sources in 
the context of a lively public debate about the failure of state institutions to 
fulfil their roles.79 While we cannot say that the Camden 28 jurors were 
given the repeated exposure, education, and knowledge about standards of 
excellence before the trial that would be consistent with a practice, they 
may have come closer to the type of knowledge gained with a practice than 
jurors in almost any other case. 
On August 22, 1971, a group of twenty-eight anti-war activists, in-
cluding two Catholic priests and a Protestant minister, broke into the draft 
 79.  See THE CAMDEN 28 (Anthony Giacchino 2006); Lynne Williams, Anti-War Protestors and 
Civil Disobedience: A Tale of Two Juries, 26 JURY EXPERT 1, 22 (Nov. 2014). I also conducted re-
search at the Swarthmore College Peace Collection which houses the Camden 28 archives and includes 
interviews with jurors, documents from the defense team, and media coverage of the case. 
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board office located on the fifth floor of the federal building in Camden, 
New Jersey.80 They attempted to destroy the paper records of all class 1-A 
draft registrants who had been cleared for unrestricted military service, but 
the action was foiled when they were caught by FBI agents, who had been 
alerted to the plan by an informant active in the group.81 Arrested and in-
dicted, seventeen participants were charged with seven felonies, including 
the destruction of government property and interfering with the Selective 
Service system.82 The trial was unusual in several ways, including the fact 
that several of the defendants represented themselves and that the inform-
ant, Tom Hardy, testified for the defense instead of cooperating with the 
prosecution. Furthermore, testimony about the history of the jury in Ameri-
ca was part of the trial in a remarkable way. 
According to defense attorney David Kairys (who worked alongside 
those defendants engaging in self-representation), the independence of the 
jury and jury nullification animated the defense team from the very begin-
ning.83 Yet, as evident in the case of the Dow Chemical plant break-in 
above, juries had not been sympathetic to acts of theft and destruction tied 
to anti-war sentiment. Still, Kairys commissioned his assistant to put to-
gether a memo on jury nullification that was circulated among the defend-
ants, and there was ongoing discussion about how to frame the actions of 
the group.84 In addition to references to the military action in Vietnam, 
including those against civilians, the defense strategy was to also include 
criticisms of Camden’s urban renewal policies that hurt its most vulnerable 
residents as examples of the failure of government in both local and inter-
national affairs.85 When called to the stand by the defense, Howard Zinn,  
the populist historian, talked about the role colonial juries played in mark-
ing a separation from England and the important role of nullification before 
the civil war when northern juries refused to convict runway slaves.86 The 
 80.  I was introduced to the case through the documentary, “The Camden 28” made by Anthony 
Giacchino, who also gave me permission to look at his research for the film. THE CAMDEN 28, supra 
note 79. 
 81.  Donald Janson, Camden 28 Jury Asks Re-Reading, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1973, at 78, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/05/19/archives/camden-28-jury-asks-rereading-hears-again-what-
informer-for.html?auth=link-dismiss-google1tap [https://perma.cc/MH3T-FMRM]. 
 82.  Id.
 83.  Transcript of Interview by Anthony Giacchino with David Kairys (2004) (on file with the 
Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Box: DG 235: 1). 
 84.  Memorandum from the Camden 28 Defense Team on Jury Nullification (1st Draft) (1973) (on 
file with the Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Box DG235.5). 
 85.  THE CAMDEN 28, supra note 79; Donald Janson, 17 of Camden 28 Found Not Guilty, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 1973, at 1, https://www.nytimes.com/1973/05/21/archives/17-of-camden-28-found-not-
guilty-admitted-draftoffice-raidboth.html [https://perma.cc/T2CC-9K69].
 86.  Transcript of Interview by Anthony Giacchino with Howard Zinn (2004) (on file with the 
Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Box DG235.2).  
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jury was again reminded of the storied history of the institution of the jury 
in David Kairys’ closing arguments.87 The repeated references to the jury’s 
previous standing in the American legal process served as a type of ongo-
ing civic education and helped jurors makes the distinction between its 
telos as an institution and obedience to the letter of the law. Another way 
jury independence and, by extension the distinctive telos of the jury, was 
conveyed to the jurors was in the emphasis on the fact that the jury verdict 
could not be overturned or second-guessed by other officials. The jurors 
were well-aware of the media coverage of the trial and knew that their de-
cision would be closely scrutinized in the media, but they did not seem to 
be worried about making the “wrong” decision.88
The judge, Clarkson Fisher, also seemed to be attuned to the dialectic 
of thought that would aide jurors in thinking about nullification. At times, 
he sustained objections made by the prosecution rebuking comments by the 
defense team about the jury’s power. On the topic of nullification, he even 
went so far as to say, “[Juries] do it but they are not supposed to do it.”89
Yet, at other points in the trial, including in the testimony of Zinn and in 
the closing statement of David Kairys, he allowed extended discussion of 
the importance of jury independence and he allowed the jurors to consider 
their actions in light of a long tradition. Judge Fisher made clear that nulli-
fication was not be considered lightly and even more forcefully said that 
the legitimacy of the war in Vietnam should not be the determining factor 
in the verdict.90 Yet, he was open to drawing attention to the questionable 
methods used by the prosecution in their employment of Tom Hardy, one 
of the participants in the group, as an informant. 
Considering the practice of jury service in relation to its ends through-
out the trial also primed the jurors to be receptive to the argument made by 
the defense that the government went “too far” in the methods it used lead-
ing up to the break-in. When the informant Tom Hardy testified on behalf 
of the defense, he emphasized how much monetary and logistical assistance 
he provided to the group, supported by the FBI.91 In a striking visual dis-
play, the jury was able to see all of the equipment purchased by the FBI for 
the break-in laid out on a table in the courtroom, and it was clear then that 
 87.  Transcript of Interview by Anthony Giacchino with David Kairys, supra note 83. 
 88.  Search for Jury Members (2002-2003), (on file with the Swarthmore College Peace 
Collection, Box:DG 235:1). 
 89.  Camden 28 Trial: Miscellaneous Documents, (on file with the Swarthmore College Peace 
Collection,  Box: DG 235:5) [hereinafter Miscellaneous Documents]. 
 90.  THE CAMDEN 28, supra note 79. 
 91.  Id.
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the crime would have been impossible to execute without it.92 Hardy also 
conveyed that he was told that the participants would be arrested during a 
practice run of the action, not after the break-in itself, incurring far less 
punishment, if any at all.93 When this early interception did not happen 
because of a directive from the White House, Hardy felt that the deal he 
made with the FBI had been undermined and this contributed to his deci-
sion to testify for the defense. When filmmaker Anthony Giacchino inter-
viewed jurors in 2002 about their reasons for a Not Guilty verdict, all five 
jurors he was able to contact thought Hardy’s experience and the FBI’s 
involvement were important reasons for the verdict.94 The 1973 Supreme 
Court decision in United States v. Russell about the limits of the govern-
ment’s ability to “manufacture crime” granted legitimacy to considering the 
role of entrapment in the break-in.95 The issue of FBI misconduct was on 
the minds of the jurors as seen in a question one of the jurors, Samuel 
Braithwaite, sent to the judge (as was allowed in the case) for the witness 
Phillip Berrigan, a Catholic anti-war activist and priest.96 Braithwaite 
asked, “If the government punishes people who break the law, who is there 
to punish the government when the government breaks the law?”97 Allow-
ing the question, Judge Fisher suggested that he was open to hearing cri-
tiques of the FBI in this case because of the Supreme Court ruling and later 
agreed to include language about the overreaching state in his charge to the 
jury.98
Jury deliberation lasted three days, and the jurors asked for a re-
reading of Hardy’s testimony as well as those of the two FBI agents who 
testified. Jurors reported heated discussion of the breaking and entering 
component of the charge. They all went to mass together at a Catholic 
church.99 Based on notes by attorney David Kairys’s newspaper clippings, 
and Giacchino’s interviews, it seems that the jurors in the Camden 28 case 
had a sense of the broader ends of the jury in way that is necessary for the 
account of the practice of jury service given here.100 This understanding did 
not rely heavily on the jury charge, rather it came from jurors being ex-
 92.  Id.
 93.  Miscellaneous Documents, supra note 89. 
 94.  Search for Jury Members (2002-2003), supra note 88. 
 95.  United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 427-29, 436 (1973).  
 96.  Camden 28: Chronology of Trial, Opening Statements, (on file with the Swarthmore College 
Peace Collection, Box:235:5). 
 97.  Id.
 98.  Id.
 99.  Miscellaneous Documents, supra note 89. 
 100.  Transcript of Interview by Anthony Giacchino with David Kairys, supra note 83. 
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posed to multiple accounts of the function of the jury and the variety of 
interventions it had made in the history of the United States. The nature of 
the trial and of the issues raised by the use of an informant put the question 
of citizenship at the fore, giving jurors an opportunity to consider the role 
and telos of the jury in relationship to the other roles in the courtroom. 
Consistent with Kadish and Kadish’s justification of the “discretion to dis-
obey,” they were able to take into account the prescribed means for jury 
action, the constraints on what they could consider in their role, and the 
broader ends of jury service and ultimately offered a not guilty verdict.101
Moreover, the case of the Camden 28 exemplifies Kadish and Kad-
ish’s observation that shifts in the ecology of legal institutions affect 
agents’ considerations of roles and ends.102 The political context of the 
Vietnam war and urban renewal in Camden, and the riots by Black and 
Latinx residents against the police, called into question whether or not the 
government was truly acting in the service of the public good.103 In this 
way, it was an unusual time where both officials and citizens had a reason 
to reconsider the ends of the roles of a police officer, city politician, and 
federal agent. Aspects of each of these roles had interfered with their ability 
to effectively achieve the ends of their role. Such a change in roles and role 
constraints reverberates across the ecological system. The Camden 28 jury 
can be understood as having a heightened sense of its own role within this 
shifting landscape and the education they received about how the history of 
jury aided in this process. The crime in question was itself commentary on 
the ends of the United States government in drafting young people for mili-
tary service. That the defendants were willing to contest their expected 
legal roles as compliant citizens opened up a similar possibility for the 
jurors. 
There are two areas where the education of the Camden 28 jurors was 
underdeveloped and reveals the need for a more systematic form of civic 
education in order to experience the benefits of a practice. The first is in the 
jurors’ apparent lack of sustained attention to erroneous uses of nullifica-
tion; that is, nullification based on prejudicial motives where the departure 
from the prescribed means was prompted by sentiments that should not 
influence the legal process. More pointedly, nullification decisions that 
convey callousness to the violence experienced by fellow citizens should 
be contended with as part of the process of juror education. Because of the 
sources of information about nullification, it seems unlikely that the Cam-
 101.  See KADISH & KADISH, supra note 37, at 11. 
 102.   Id. 
 103.  THE CAMDEN 28, supra note 79. 
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den 28 jurors would have been exposed to much of this information, though 
they may have thought about it in the context of their closed-door delibera-
tions. The second area that must be enhanced for the sake of the practice 
are the standards of excellence jurors must develop for themselves as they 
engage with the function and prescribed means of the jury. The Aristotelian 
basis for the idea of a practice carries with it the hope of the improvement 
of character through the activity itself and the opportunities for growth and 
reflection it entails. This improvement requires scrutinizing the assump-
tions, contradictions, and biases one brings to the work of being a juror and 
is best developed over time. The jurors in the Camden 28 trial did not nec-
essarily have to engage with these questions, though they likely appeared 
during deliberation. Moreover, the jurors in the Camden 28 case were pre-
sented with a group of defendants toward whom they may have been par-
ticularly sympathetic, but in developing a sense of the standards of 
excellence of the practice, they must also confront cases where they lack 
this sympathy. Considering jury service to be a practice entails not only a 
sophisticated understanding of the complexity of the endeavor, but of the 
individual virtues one must cultivate. 
At this moment in American history, as in the early 1970’s, the legal 
system is experiencing shifts in the ecology of political and legal institu-
tions and their roles. With the Cliven Bundy case in Oregon, where a jury 
found the defendant not guilty of occupation of federal land, to cases of 
activists arrested during Black Lives Matter protests, politically motivated 
cases on both the right and the left are making their way to trial.104 Juries 
are once again on the front lines of determining what crimes to punish 
when legal and political authority is questioned. Furthermore, investigation 
of bias within the legal system, including with policing, prison treatment, 
and treatment by judges, have led to greater reflection on the ends of each 
stage in the process and the professionals who are engaged in the corre-
sponding practices. The role of juror is thus primed to be reconsidered as a 
practice, with renewed attention to the education required for it. Under-
standing jury service as a practice in the way described by MacIntyre al-
lows for a break in the impasse that has settled into debates about 
nullification as a type of “nuclear option” in the legal literature and can 
contribute to jurors understanding their function in this transformed legal 
 104.  Sam Levin & Lauren Dake, Bundy Brothers Found Not Guilty of Conspiracy in Oregon 
Militia Standoff, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/oct/27/oregon-militia-standoff-bundy-brothers-not-guilty-
trial#:~:text=A%20jury%20has%20found%20that,ranchers%20in%20the%20American%20west.; 
Vaidya Gullapalli, Decades-Old Protections for Protesters Are in Jeopardy, THE APPEAL (Dec. 11, 
2019), https://theappeal.org/decades-old-protections-for-protesters-are-in-jeopardy/. 
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ecology. If we understand nullification as a practice rather than a secret that 
is to be revealed in the jury charge, we increase awareness of the standards 
of excellence for jury service, including interrogation of appropriate con-
siderations and excluded concerns when considering the verdict. To 
achieve the status of a practice, there is a need for jury education in sec-
ondary school, college, and community organizations so that the telos of 
the jury, and the many skills that are necessary to achieve it, can be better 
understood. The circumstance of the Camden 28 case, including the nature 
of the crime, the use of an informant, the range of witnesses, and pro se
representation by some of the defendants all served to spark in the jurors a 
heightened consideration of the telos of a jury. It is this sense of vitality and 
significance that all potential jurors should be aware of before they ever 
receive a jury summons. 
